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Data security is a major concern in computer systems
today. Data security is a crucial issue in data management
systems (DBMS) , more important than in any other type of
software. While the database approach brings advantages to
the user, it also creates new, more intense problems in
the areas of security and integrity. In the traditional
approach, where each application system has its own files,
a limited amount of data sharing is achieved by passing
files from one system to another. Typically a database
contains data of various degrees of importance and levels
of sensitivity. This data is shared among a wide variety
of users with different responsibilities and privileges.
Therefore it becomes important to restrict database users
to those portions of the total data that are necessary to
their activities. Additionally, more control is needed
over what changes a user can make to data because of the
many ways these changes can affect other users of the
database. This increased level of sharing means that
access to the data must be controlled in order to ensure
security and privacy.
Maintaining security of the database can be viewed as
protecting the data against illegal or invalid retrieval,
modification, or destruction. This may be achieved by a
set of access control rules. The effectiveness of access
2controls rests on two premises. The first is proper user
identification: no one should be able to acquire the
access rights of another. This premise is met through
authentication procedures at login. The second premise is
that information specifying the access rights of each user
or program is protected from unauthorized modification.
This premise is met by controlling access to system
objects as well as to user objects.
This paper presents various models to enforce access
control rules. First some conceptual ideas are introduced.
Then an exposition of the models used most often is made.
These include access matrix, authorization list (access
list), capability list, takegrant and query modification.
Finally, the protection mechanisms of three systems,
INGRES, DB2, and System/38 are analyzed. These three sys
tems were chosen because they represent three different
approaches. The first deals with the problem by using
query-modification and access control lists; the second
uses a combination of access control lists, a hierarchy
and view mechanisms to provide security; abd the third
uses capability list and enforces access control at a most
lower level, at the hardware, microcode level.
2. Concegts
* i- 9y*.t2eDtiEi.iQD Methods
The first step in a security mechanism of any kind is
to identify the person who is trying to gain access to or
use the object one is guarding. In a database management
system where a high level of data sharing is implied, this
identification becomes essential. Various methods for ver
ifying the identity of users, or authenticating them, will
be explored.
Before discussing authentication methods, it is
necessary to understand the interactions between identifi
cation, authentication, and authorization, all of which
together determine what access is granted to protected
resources. Identification is a unique name or number
assigned to subjects (users); authentication verifies that
a person or subject is who he, she or it claims to be; and
authorization is whether a person or subject is legiti
mately entitled to a protected resource. All of these are
used together to make access decisions.
i* ! Identification
In our context a user can be a person, any member of
a group of persons associated with some common project or
assignment, any member of a category of persons sharing
some common attribute, or a program acting on behalf of a
person, group or category of persons.
The identification of a user, program or other sub
ject is the unique name or number assigned to that sub
ject. It is only a
"claim" of identity. Identification is
necessary for accounting and authorization purposes, but
cannot be used without additional authentication if some
degree of security is desired in a system.
2. 1. 2. Authentication
Authentication verifies that a person (subject) is
who he, she or it claims to be. There are several types of
information which may be required before an identification
is accepted as valid. While authentication is generally
done once, periodic verifications may be required in high
security installations, and reauthent icat ion may be desir
able after all system crashes.
There are three approaches to authentication of iden
tity and they invoke something the user "knows", something
the user "has" or something the user "is". Authentication
by something the user knows is the cheapest scheme and
currently the most widely used. The technique most com
monly used is a password.
The password method requires the user to provide a
string of characters for the computer to check. If the
password matches the one that the computer already associ
ates with a given user, access is permitted to all the
information that is authorized to that user.
In a simple password scheme the user is allowed to
choose a password that is easy for him to remember. The
advantage of this scheme is that the user should not need
to write it down where someone can see it. But care must
be taken not to choose a password which is too obvious, or
one which anyone who has knowledge of the user can deter
mine with a few guesses.
A way to avoid this is to assign the user a randomly
generated password. The problem here is that such a pass
word could be difficult to memorize and the user will tend
to write it down. One solution to this is to provide a
generator of
"pronounceable" random passwords. Multics
CSALT743, for example, generates an eight -character pass
word which has English-like characteristics, so it is both
pronounceable and easy to memorize.
Another technique sometimes used is to put spaces and
backspaces in the password CH0FF77] . This will prevent
anyone who finds a password written in a piece of paper to
use it correctly.
The password schemes mentioned above are all suscep
tible to wiretapping. There are three ways to overcome
this: to use cryptographic techniques, one-time passwords
and transformation techniques. For the one-time method,
the user is given a list of N passwords; the same N pass
words are stored in the computer. After using a password
for login the user crosses it off the list. The next login
requires use of the next password on the list. But this
approach may not be feasible on highly used systems, where
either there are many users or each user signs on quite
often. Also, if used, the user must remember or carry the
entire password list and must also keep track of the
current password.
The transformation technique consists of the user
remembering and performing an algebraic transformation on
a string of random digits. The computer supplies the ran
dom digits. The user does the transformation and returns
the answer. The computer also does the transformation and
compares the answers. If they agree the authentication is
successful and the user is allowed access.
Another method used to verify the identity of a user
is through the quest ionanswer method. A set of answers to
"m" standard and
"n" user supplied questions is stored in
the computer. When the user attempts to login, some (or
all) of these questions are chosen at random and asked by
the system. The user must answer all the questions
correctly in order to be granted access to the system.
The techniques discussed above fall under the
category of something the user "knows". But as already
mentioned, the authentication could also be made through
something the user "has". The most common in this category
are badges and cards. Cards may contain optical bar codes
or a Hollerith code. Plastic cards with a magnetic strip
or implanted magnetic slug may also be used CHSIA793.
These cards can be inserted into a terminal for identifi
cation. They can be designed to resist forgers and,
although they can be given to others or be lost or stolen,
their possession can be made mandatory and is easy to
check. For example, the cards may be assigned additional
functions such as operating a cardkey lock to gain access
to the terminal room.
The use of personal characteristics, or something the
user "is", is the most expensive way of authenticating
users and, to date, the least developed CWAKE773 . Some of
the techniques explored are physical appearance like ana
tomical measures (weight, height) and hand geometry; voice
recognition, where the relative energy content of each of
several voice frequencies is measured (the resulting fre
quency profile is matched against those of persons seeking
access) ; signature verification; and fingerprint analysis.
aAll these techniques involve the use of complex dev
ices, and considerable processing time and storage space
may be required. At present they are considered too costly
for general applications, but future advances in hardware
technology may facilitate their use.
2. 2. Entities
All the access control models or mechanisms to be
discussed try to explain the relationship between users,
the data stored in the database and the privileges of
access the users have over the data. As a mode of general
ization, these three components will be referred to as
subjects (s), objects (o) , and privileges (p). Other com
ponents may be included in some of the models (e.g. flags,
predicates), but these three are the most essential and
are expressed in some way or another in all models. The
choice of the subjects, objects, and privileges or rules
of a protection system is at the discretion of the system
designer and will be made to meet the protection and shar
ing requirements of the given system.
. 2 . i . Subjects
A subject is any person or other entity that can
request access to a protected object. The most important
subjects are the "users", particularly the end users, of
the database. There may be a directory of users, which may
contain user profiles that describe attributes of users.
Such attributes can define access rights or default
authorization characteristics. This information is also
used for evaluation of requests or of content -dependent
access rules.
There are two types of subjects, one is the user per
se and the other the administrator. Users are the subjects
that usually provide the data to be stored in the database
or that request data from the database in order to make
further decisions. The end user is the class of user that
is of the most concern with regard to security, because
the end user is usually separated from the system and
therefore less subject to physical, personal, or pro
cedural security. Some end users may be limited to
specific data because of the organization they work for,
or the organization from where the data originated.
On the other hand there is an administrator of the
database (one person or a group of persons), who has such
responsibilities as creating the databases of the system
(though not for placing data in them) or determining the
name, number, and size of the various files or relations
to be placed in the permanent databases. The administrator
is also responsible for maintaining and reorganizing the
database so that it performs in the most efficient manner.
He may be responsible for defining the security system,
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the protection data and the enforcement rules. This last
responsibility may also be assigned to a different person
such as a System Security Officer.
The separation of these two kinds of users is not
always obvious. In a small environment there may be no
such distinction. But then, further problems may arise,
like the conflict of ownership (this will be discussed
later in the section of Administrative policies).
Distinguishing users from administrators may make the
task of security enforcement much easier. The authorizer' s
job may be simplified even more by the definition of
"groups" or "classes" of users. When a user group is given
access rights, all users belonging to the group receive
those rights. Subsequently, a user who joins a group
automatically receives all the rights of the group.
A user group is simply a named collection of users,
each of which has previously been defined to the system.
Consider the following example:
DEFINE USERS (SMITH, DOE, JONES)
DEFINE GROUP (PR0J1) USERS (SMITH, DOE)
DEFINE GROUP (PR0J2) USERS (DOE, JONES)
In the example, two user groups called PR0J1 and
PR0J2 are defined, PR0J1 consists of the users SMITH and
DOE, and PR0J2 consists of the users DOE and JONES. When
11
the user JONES enters the system he may access any objects
authorized either to JONES or to PR0J2.
The concept of user groups is extremely useful for
implementing organizational concepts, such as department
or project, within the security framework. The implementa
tion of the concept of user groups should require the user
to identify his group membership before the execution of
his job begins. If a user who is a member of one or more
groups enters a job with no group identification he should
be granted access only to those objects explicitly author
ized to him. In this way the user may, for example, test a
program on his files without endangering files belonging
to the entire group.
One can also treat transactions or application pro
grams as subjects and control their access to data. An
application is a set of transactions or programs that
accomplish related functions. If users belong to more than
one group or use more than one application, their rights
at any moment may depend on both their identity and the
group or application. One way of expressing this require
ment is to use the group name or application name in the
predicate of an access rule. For example SMITH may be
allowed access to SALARY only when using the PAYROLL
application. Another way is to make the subject a "com
ponent", such as (user, group) or (user, application)
12
CFERN813. The composite's rights can be granted explicitly
or can be calculated from individual and group rights.
2. g. 2. Objects
Objects are the things in the system which have to be
protected. Some of the most important concerns in authori
zation have to do with the choice of objects to protect.
Some of the points to consider are:
- The level of the objects to be protected (external
schema, conceptual schema or internal schema).
The size of the unit of protection (file, record,
field).
- Protection through view, if the concept of view
exists in the system.
- Protection of data description. Some systems separate
data from description of data.
(a) Level of objects
The protected objects are at all levels (external,
conceptual and internal), but the access rules should be
specified at the conceptual level. This is so because
access rules specified for the conceptual level apply
regardless of how those objects are viewed or used by dif
ferent applications. If there is a need to specify
13
external access rules these should be consistent with the
rules derived from the conceptual level access rules.
(b) Granularity
A commonly used level of granularity is the file
level (relation, or record type). Sometimes a larger
granularity will be sufficient, and groups of files are
protected as a single object. The groups can be defined in
various ways such as: a subtree of a hierarchical direc
tory structure, an explicit naming of group members,
storage in the same physical area or common name portions
in a multipart name.
Any number of defined files could be collected
within, a named group, and a defined file could be allowed
to be a member of more than one group. For example:
DEFINE FILES (ABC, DEF, XYZ)
DEFINE GROUP (PAYROLL) FILES (ABC, DEF)
DEFINE GROUP (PERSONNEL) FILES (DEF, XYZ)
The concept of file groups is extremely useful to accommo
date the notion of departmental files, the files of an
individual, and the like.
But file level control does not always suffice. As
will be explained later (Policies section) there is a need
in many situations for policies of field-level control and
content -dependent control. Control could be specified at
14
the record or field level as needed. One approach to
field-level access control is to write rules about "field
types", and to derive from them the rules about columns or
fields. The problem with this approach is that the same
field type may have a different meaning in different rela
tions, and automatic derivation would be inappropiate. For
example, suppose that a field type named SALARY appears in
two relations: EMPLOYEE (NAME, SALARY) and LIMIT (JOBNAME,
SALARY). A personnel department employee might need access
to SALARY in the LIMIT relation but should not be allowed
to know individual salaries. Field- level access rules
therefore must have as their objects the fields of a file
or relation.
(c) Views as objects
One way to provide authorization with finer granular
ity is to define tailored views for different users
according to their needs and then control access to the
views. Because the views can be used to create a subset of
the rows of a relation, a subset of the columns of a rela
tion or a subset of a combination of rows and columns, the
view can be used effectively to screen parts of a table
that a user should not see.
There may be some restrictions on the way a user can
manipulate the data accessible to him through a view. Even
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if he has some rights to the views he creates these may be
limited. Certain operations, for example, creation of an
index, or update to a "statistical" view, may not be pei
formed on the view. A user's rights are also limited to
the ones he possesses regarding the underlying relation
from which he creates new views. For example, if he has
read-only access to a relation he should have read-only
access to any view he defines on top of it. If the view
involves more than one underlying relation, the user's
privileges may be constrained by the intersection of the
privileges which he holds on the underlying relations.
(d) Data Description as objects
The description of an object and the values of that
object are conceptually distinct, and access to them could
be separately controlled. The security control of data
description should be assigned to an administrator rather
than to endusers.
Transactions and programs were considered subjects,
receiving access rights according to their purposes. But
it is also necessary to control access to them, since they
indirectly provide access to data objects. Users could be
authorized RUN or EXECUTE privileges to programs or tran
sact ions.
16
2.2.3. Pciviigagg
The third component of the protection system is the
privilege, expressed as a rule, which determine the
accessing of objects by subjects. The rules are the heart
of the access control mechanism of the database management
system. The rules must be simple, allowing users to gain
an immediate understanding of their scope and use. They
must be complete, not allowing a subject to gain unauthor
ized access to an object. They must be flexible, providing
mechanisms which easily allow the desired degree of
authorized sharing of objects among subjects. They must be
easy to change so as to prevent the user from avoiding
them or giving more access than necessary.
(a) Access types
In the database there is a set of operations which
can be performed on each category of objects. These allow
able operations form a set of possible access types, and
access rules grant a subset of them to specific subjects.
Some of the categories in which the rules can be based
are:
(1) Zero-level access
The subject can do nothing with the object. Most
probably it implies that his authority has been revoked.
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As far as the subject is concerned that object does not
exist for him any more.
(2) Executeonly access
This access rule applies to programs or transactions.
It means the subject can execute the program but he will
not be permitted to read the instruction sequence or to
modify it in any way. It could be specified with commands
like RUN or EXECUTE.
(3) Readonly access
The subject is allowed only to retrieve the object.
He is not permitted to manipulate or alter data in any
way. The subject could be allowed to use a command like
READ, or to apply statistical operators such as AVErage.
(4) Read-write access
With this privilege the subject is allowed to update
or change the information in the object, through commands
like UPDATE, WRITE, INSERT.
(5) Create objects
The subject is granted the privilege to create
objects and may also have the privilege to delete them
(DEFINE, CREATE and DELETE or DROP). The subject may then
be assigned an
"owner" privilege over those objects he
18
creates, which allows him to grant some privileges to
other users over the objects he "owns".
(6) Grant and Revoke
A subject who owns an object (as mentioned above) or
that was granted some privileges over a given object may
have the right to grant some privileges to other users. If
he does not own the object he must have been granted some
privileges with the option to "grant" them. Typically a
subject grants to others a set of the privileges he
possesses. These may include:
READ - the ability to read the object and the ability
to define views based on the table (if it is a rela-
t iona 1 syst em ) .
INSERT - ability to insert records or rows in the
file or relation.
DELETE - ability to delete records from the file.
UPDATE - ability to modify existing data in the file.
GRANT - the ability to further grant privileges to
others.
Depending on the way the rules are to be implemented
the GRANT privilege could be specified by a "copy
flag" or
by a command 1 i ke :
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GRANT
ALL RIGHTS
(privileges)
ALL BUT (privileges)
ON (object) TO (user-id>
CWITH GRANT OPTION]
REVOKE is a privilege which usually goes together
with GRANT. It is the privilege that gives the holder the
ability to revoke the authorities granted. Only the gran
tor may revoke access, so REVOKE implies GRANT.
The problem with revocation is its propagation. Con
sideration should be given to the way it is going to
affect privileges of other users. For example, if a user Y
revokes some privileges from user X in a lower level on
the hierarchical structure, other users below X to whom X
granted some privileges could loose all their privileges.
Another approach is to let them keep the privileges and
make Y responsible and decide which of the privileges, if
any, should also be revoked.
As previously discussed, subjects may be separated
into end-users and administrators. If the security struc
ture one wants to implement calls for the specification of
an administrator, then the mechanism must provide to these
administrators a set of
"control" or "administer"
privileges to help them achieve their function.
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The most common rights given to an administrator are
GRANT and REVOKE. Others could be the rights to DEFINE and
DELETE objects (e. g databases, relations, files). Once he
creates objects, as databases, he can delegate rights to
users through the GRANT right, and he then has the author
ity to remove these rights from them if necessary. Depend
ing on the structure (e. g. hierarchy) and needs of the
installation, administrators may not receive rights to
actually manipulate the data in the databases (READ,
INSERT, UPDATE). In this way his function is limited only
to CONTROL or ADMINISTER objects in the database.
(b) The use of predicates for control
Finer granularity could be desired when specifying
access rules. An access decision may need to be based in
more than just controlling access to a record or field. It
may be necessary to consider the value of the fields. The
contentdependent and context-dependent policies, to be
discussed later, are some of the situations which require
this type of control. For content -dependent access control
the authorizer defines predicates whose evaluation depends
on the contents of the database or on system variables
such as time of day or terminal ID. The predicate
DEPT - "MATH" AND TIME-OF-DAY > "1200"
21
would allow access only to the MATH department records and
only after noon.
Suppose one wishes to restrict a certain set of users
from accessing the field EMPNO together with SALARY
(context-dependent access control). In other words,
although the users have separate access to both fields,
they should not be able to deduce the salaries of indivi
dual employees. One could write this constraint as
NOT (EMPNO, SALARY)
in the rule specifying access to the EMPLOYEE relation.
Any access rules specified for views defined on the
EMPLOYEE relation then have to be checked for consistency
with this constraint. Since NAME also uniquely identifies
the employee the constraint should be extended as:
NOT (EMPNO, SALARY) AND NOT (NAME, SALARY)
The language used to express these predicates usually
provides for key words like WHERE. For example a predicate
could test a data value, WHERE (COURSE. DEPT 'MATH'), or
test for the value of some system variable, such as WHERE
(SYSTEM. USER_ ID 'JONES').
Predicates are the mechanism used on the DBMS that
utilize views to enforce access rules. A predicate is used
in the definition of the view to select specific records
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or fields to be included in the user view. For exampli
DEFINE MY_DEPT VIEW AS:
SELECT EMP, LOC
WHERE EMP. DEPT LOC. DEPT
AND EMP. MGR = USER
This view is built from the join of two base relations EMP
and LOC. It allows one to see the name, salary, manager,
department and location of each employee who reports
directly to the user of the view.
(c) Authorization time
Some of the access rules could be enforced at
compi lat iontime. But others like the content -dependent
and context-dependent rules have to be enforced at execu
tion time. These rules require that the data be read and
evaluated. It is not until the values of the data are
retrieved that the decision to grant or deny access can be
taken.
(d) Authorization by classification levels
In some installations such as military or government
ones, information is classified and users are assigned a
clearance according to their rank or position in a
hierarchical organization. Typical classification levels
might be top secret, secret, confidential and unclassi
fied. Objects are grouped in a set of categories. Access
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is defined by a combination of categories and classifica
tion levels. There are two fundamental security rules: (1)
no user can access (read) an object if the object's clas
sification level is greater than the user's clearance
level, and (2) only specially authorized users may reduce
(downgrade) or remove categories from a classified object.
2. 3. Security Princites
In order to understand any mechanism or model built
to enforce access control rules, it is convenient to point
out the principles behind those mechanisms. There is a
series of policies which serve as guidelines for the
development of security mechanisms. These policies are
given by user needs, the installation environment, insti
tutional regulations, and legal constraints. The princi
ples to be discussed are divided into three groups: design
policies, administration policies and access-control
specification policies.
2. 3. 1 . Design Policies
Salt zer and Schoeder identified several design prin
ciples for protection mechanisms CSALT753 :
(a) Least privilege
Every user and process of the system should have the
least set of access rights necessary to complete the job.
4This principle limits the damage that can result from
error or malicious attack. It implies that processes
should execute in "small protection domains" CDENN82J ,
consisting of only those rights needed to complete their
tasks. It also reduces the number of interactions among
programs. It reduces the number of possible sources for
information leaks and minimizes the possibility that the
integrity of the database be violated. Thus, if a question
arises related to misuse of a right, the number of pro
grams to be audited is minimized. This principle is simi
lar to the military security rule of need-to-know.
(b) Economy of mechanism
The design should be kept as simple and small as pos
sible so that it can be verified and correctly imple
mented. Although the system must be sufficiently flexible
to handle a variety of protection policies, it is better
to implement a simple mechanism that meets the require
ments of the system than it is to implement one with com
plicated features that may not be used.
(c) Complete mediation
Every access to every object must be checked for
authority. This principle is the basis of the protection
system. It implies that a method of identifying the source
of every request must be devised.
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(d) Open vs. closed design
The design should not be secret. Security should not
depend on the ignorance of the intruder, but rather on the
possession of specific, more easily protected keys or
passwords. This separation of protection mechanisms from
protection keys permit the mechanism to be examined
without concern that the safeguard will be endangered.
This principle becomes important also in a decentral
ized system, as it may not be realistic to maintain
secrecy in such a system.
(e) Least common mechanism
However, distributes security enforcement, so that no
one system function has major responsibility for all forms
of security enforcement.
(f) Fail safe
Base access decisions on permission rather than
exclusion. That is, access should be allowed only if
"explicitly
authorized" instead of being allowed "unless"
explicitly forbidden. So the default situation is lack of
access. In this way a design or implementation mistake in
a mechanism that gives explicit permission tends to fail
by refusing permission, a safe situation, since it will be
quickly detected. On the other hand, a design or
26
implementation mistake in a mechanism that explicitly
excludes access tends to fail by allowing access, a
failure which may go unnoticed in normal use.
(g) Psychological acceptability
The mechanism must be easy to use so that it will be
applied correctly. It should provide a convenient inter
face for the user (or DBA) to permit an easy, consistent,
and efficient way of defining and maintaining the protec
tion data.
2. 3. 2. Administration Policies
(a) Ownership vs. Administration
The concept of ownership is important when dealing
with the transfer of privileges. A user can grant and deny
other users access to a data object if he is the owner of
the object. The owner of a database is sometimes con
sidered the person responsible for creating the data. To
become the owner of an object, the user must satisfy and
agree with a set of rules. At minimum he must have been
assigned the privilege to create objects. When a user
becomes an owner of an object, the system assigns an
"own"
attribute for the object as part of that user's
privi leges.
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However, with many shared databases, it may be diffi
cult to identify a unique owner. Even if there is or is
not a concept of ownership, there is always the need for
an administrative function, whose objective is to define
the data shared by the users and to control its use.
There could be then an administrator who "owns" all
databases, can perform all data management operations, may
authorize other users to use the databases and is subject
to further administrative rules. The owners, on the other
hand, own private databases, can perform all data manage
ment operations on their own databases, and may authorize
other users to access their databases. There may also be
some nonowner users, who do not own a database, can pei
form only some data management operations and may not
authorize other users to use the databases.
In addition to this three-level hierarchy Hsiao iden
tifies two other types of organizations: a multi-level
sub-ownership authorization hierarchy, and
two- level
transfer ownership authorization hierarchy CHSIA783.
The multi-level sub-ownership hierarchy has the fol
lowing structure:
(1) Each database has an owner. The owner of a database
may assign a portion of the database to a user and
designate him as a subowner. The subowner can further
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divide his portion of the database into other objects
and designate others as subowners of the portions.
(2) Sub-ownership can only be removed by the owner who
originally authorized the sub-ownership.
(3) Ownership and sub-ownership can be established,
replaced and removed. However co-ownership is not
allowed.
(4) Owners or subowners can perform all the database
management operations on their private portions of
the database.
In this kind of hierarchy, at every level of data
objects (e.g. records, subfiles, files, databases), there
is some single user who is directly responsible for the
control of the object.
The two- level transfer-ownership hierarchy enables
the creator of a database to become the owner of the data
base, as already mentioned. The particularity of this
structure is that an owner can transfer the ownership of
his database to another user. Once he transfers ownership,
he no longer can access the database; he is not even a
user of the database. The advantage of this structure is
that there are not subowners, no co-owners, thereby avoid
ing the situation where two co-owners attempt to cancel or
9interfere with each other in terms of authorization.
(b) Centralization vs. Decentralization
A fundamental administrative policy is to choose
between centralized or decentralized security controls.
With centralized control, a single authorizer (or group)
controls all security aspects of the system. The central
ized approach has the psychological drawback that the cen
tral administrator has too much "power", and that the
"owner"
of the data can not control it. This may be the
approach taken in a small environment, but in a large or
complex database it could be more realistic and efficient
to have decentralized control. Decentralized control is
needed to place control of security at the level that is
most meaningful.
We have the situation where systems are becoming much
more dynamic. A large system typically has several groups
or users. Each group wants to share a central pool of
data. But also it wants to easily create and maintain
private data. The decentralization of authorization is
independent of whether the database itself is centralized
or distributed.
A model for decentralization of security functions
developed by Wood and Fernandez CW00D793 is presented.
This model takes an approach similar to the multi-level
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sub-ownership structure described in the preceding sec
tion.
The model distinguishes between two types of rights:
(1) administrative rights, are privileges to "control"
other user's access to data; (2) access rights, are the
ones that allow the user to access and manipulate the data
in the files. The objects of delegation of authorization
functions are called "classes". A data class is a set of
data object occurrences. These classes could be parti
tioned into "subclasses".
In the model the structure of classes is described by
a "class structure graph" where nodes represent classes
and a directed arc from node 'i' to node 'j' indicates
that class 'j' is a member of class ' i' . A user is given
ADMINISTER right to a class. An administrator of class D
may define subclasses of D and delegate his administra
tion.
The various rights associated with the task of
administration may be delegated separately or in groups.
These include:
al - Right to create, delete and modify objects in D
a2 - Right to define and delete D
a3 - Right to authorize READ access to objects in D
a4 - Right to authorize DELETE access to objects in D
a5 - Right to authorize UPDATE access to objects in D
a& - Right to authorize INSERT access to objects in D
a7 - Right to recall a delegated right for D
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Rights a2 thru a6 are called CONTROL (C) rights, and
al thru a6 ADMINISTER (A) rights. In the example the nota
tion (s, D, t, f) is used, where ' s' is the administrator
(or user), ' D' is a class (or subclass), 't' the right
type and ' f ' indicates if the administrator has the right
to further delegate (true or false).
(DBA1, Di, A, true)
^"""\^d2
(DBA2, D2, C, true) (DBA3, D3, C, false)
(DBA4, D4, a3, true)
d5
(U2, 01, READ, false)
(Ul, VI, READ, DELETE , fall
UPDATE, INSERT
Figure 1
Figure 1 shows a sequence of delegations dl to d5.
Administrator DBA1, with ADMINISTER access to class Dl and
with right to delegate, delegates to DBA2 the right to
CONTROL class D2 (with right to delegate), and to DBA3 the
right to CONTROL D3 (with no right to delegate). DBA2
delegates administration right a3 to DBA4 and gives user
Ul a set of access rights on view VI (an object in D2) .
DBA4 grants U2 read access to object 01 (of class D4) .
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As administration and database access are separate
functions, a reorganization of the administration function
should not mean that some users of the system can no
longer access the database. Only administrative rights are
revoked when a delegated class is recalled. Access rights
authorized by the DBA whose administrative rights were
revoked are not deleted but become the responsibility of
the recalling DBA. The new structure of the graph when
CONTROL right is revoked on class D from DBA2 is shown in
figure 2. The situation now is logically equivalent to
DBA1 having authorized all the access rules. As can be
seen user Ul and U2 are still authorized to access the
database.
(DBA1, Dl, A, true)
(U2, 01, READ, false)
d4
(DBA3, D2, C, false)
V
(Ul, Vi, READ, DELETE , false)
UPDATE, INSERT
Figure 2
In this model the delegation policy allows an
administrator to delegate the rights for a class to only
one administrator. If it is necessary to have multiple
administrators for some set of objects, then overlapping
classes must be defined and separately delegated. This
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avoids the situation where an administrator receives
administrative rights to a class from two different dele-
gators; thus revocation is simplified.
The concept of centralization and decentralization
has been referred in the literature also as discretionary
and non-discretionary controls. Discretionary implies that
the individual user may, at his own discretion, determine
who is authorized to access the objects he creates. If the
need arises to impose limits on the use of discretionary
controls, then these limits are viewed as non-
discretionary. A combination of both types of controls can
be applied.
2. 3. 3. Accesscontrol Goecification Policies
The granularity of access control desired will deter
mine the security measurements needed to be implemented.
It is crucial for the successful implementation of a
secure data management system that no user is given more
information about the structure or content of a database
than he is entitled to view. The existence of unviewable
fields as well as their content should be hidden from
users. It is much harder for a penetrator to obtain access
to secret data if he does not know of its existence or of
the name under which it is stored.
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(a) Namedependent access control
This is the minimum control requirement when specify
ing the data objects a user can access. Different levels
of granularity could be specified, the lowest or finest
one being field or item name (column, in a relational
database). It is sometimes referred as content -independent
access control because a decision on whether or not to
allow a data access can be made without using data values.
Security contraints that are independent of a particular
data value can have their access decision made once per
job execution.
(b) Content -dependent access control
Access rules could be extended by specifying control
depending on the value or content of a field. For example
restricting a particular user from seeing a field named
SALARY in every record of a file is independent of the
specific value in that field, while restricting a user
from seeing values of SALARY in excess of *10, 000 is a
content -dependent control.
Content -dependent control must be interpreted in a
general sense. The decision may depend upon the value of
any datum in the system and not just the particular datum
to which access is desired. For example, if a user is per
mitted access to salary data only between the hours of 9
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and 5, then the current time is the datum in which the
security decision depends. For this type of control, data
values must first be retrieved from the database in order
to determine whether or not the access request should be
satisfied. This implies that the enforcement will be per
formed at execution time and that the evaluation must be
repeated for each potential data element in the same
class.
(c) Context-dependent access control
The policy of context-dependent control refers to
using a combination of items. One aspect of this policy
restricts the fields that can be accessed together. For
example, in a relation containing employee names and
salaries, one may want to prevent some users from finding
the salaries of particular employees. One alternative
would be to prevent any access at all to those relations.
But to maximize sharing, one could allow separate access
to names and salaries while preventing users from access
ing them together. Another aspect of the policy is the
requirement that certain fields appear together.
(d) History-dependent access control
It may be necessary to control not only the context
in the immediate request, but also the content of previous
requests, if one wants to prevent users from making
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certain deductions. For example, let's suppose there is an
employee relation which contains a project-ident if ier
attribute; a user could list first all names and projects
and then all salaries and projects. He can then make some
correlation between names and salaries. Preventing this
kind of deduction requires history-dependent control,
which takes into account not only the context of the
immediate request but also all past requests. The current
access of the user is restricted because of accesses he
made in the past.
3. Models
Several models to express access control needs have
been developed. These models intend to aid the security
administrator or manager in charge of the system's secu
rity to express (or model) the relationship among sub
jects, objects, and access privileges the first ones have
over the latter. The models to be discussed use different
techniques to describe these relationships. Some use a
matrix (row, columns), or a variation of it; others use
directed graphs and others explicitly indicate the rules
using predicates.
Some of the models have gone beyond the phase of
modeling and have been implemented in more or less the
same way they are used to model the access control rules.
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These will be covered latter. Now an overall definition of
models used most often is presented.
3 ! Access tutrix
The access-matrix model provides a framework for
describing protection systems. The model was independently
developed by researchers in both the operating system area
and the database area. The model is defined in terms of
state and state transitions, where the state of a protec
tion system is represented by a matrix, and the state
transitions are described as commands.
The protection system comprises three parts, which
will be reflected as components of the model. The first
component is a set of 'objects', 0, an object being an
entity to which access must be controlled. Examples of
objects are files, relations, and fields. The second com
ponent is a set of 'subjects', S, a subject being an
active entity whose access to objects must be controlled.
The model assumes that subjects are considered to be
objects, thus, S L 0. The third component of the protec
tion system is the set of rules which govern the accessing
of objects by subjects.
All information specifying the type of access sub
jects have to objects is regarded as constituting a 'pro
tection state' of the system. This protection state is
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represented as an 'access matrix', A, with subjects iden
tifying the rows and objects the columns. The entry ACS, XI
contains strings, called 'access attributes' specifying
the access privileges held by subject S to object X. If
string 'a' appears in ACS, XI, then "S has 'a' access to
X". For example, in Figure 3, subject S , may read F.^ ,
since 'read' appears in flCSt , Ft 3 , or, Sa may update Fa .
control owner owner read
write
execute
control owner update owner
control delete owner
Figure 3
Access Matrix
Graham and Denning C6RAH723 associate with each type
of object a "monitor" through which all accesses to
objects of that type must pass to be validated. Examples
of monitors are the file system for files, the hardware
for instructions execution and the protection system for
subjects (see Figure 4). An access proceeds as follow:
(1) S initiates access to X in manner 'a'.
(2) The computer system supplies the triple (S, a, X) to
the monitor of X.
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(3) The monitor of X interrogates the access matrix to
determine if *a' is in ACS, X] ; if it is, access is
permitted, otherwise, it is denied and a protection
violation occurs.
The access attributes are interpreted by object moni
tors at the times accesses are attempted. Figure 4 shows
the organization of the protection system. The mechanisms
between the dashed lines of the diagram are invisible to
subjects - subjects direct their references to objects -
these references are then intercepted and validated by the
monitors of the system.
Subjects
read F
S.:
grant ' a' to Sj , X
delete b from Sp, Y
Syst em Intervent ion
Monitors
> I
I Objects
I-
(S-, read, F) File
System iA
(S; , grant, a, Sh, X)
-s
(SK, delete, b, Sp, Y>A
Access
Matrix
Monitor
Access
Matrix fc4
Files
^
i,
V.
Figure 4
Organization of protection system
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The foregoing rules govern the use, by monitors, of
the access matrix, once it has been specified. There is
also a series of rules for changing the access matrix
itself. These rules will be enforced by the monitor of the
access matrix. Unlike the monitors of the system's
objects, the access matrix monitor may modify the access
matrix. In particular, it may transfer, grant, or delete
access attributes on command of subjects and only on
appropiate authorization. For this purpose attributes
'owner' and 'control' are introduced, as well as the
notion of a 'copy flag' (denoted by an asterisk), and the
rules Rl - R3 of Table I, to be implemented by the access
matrix monitor.
Rule 1 permits a subject to transfer any access
attribute it holds for an object to any other subject,
provided the copy flag of the attribute is set, and it may
specify whether the copy flag of the transferred attribute
is to be set; in Figure 3, for example, S1 may place
'read*' in ACSa, F1 3 , but it may not transfer its ability
to execute T. to any other subject. Rule 2 permits a sub
ject to grant to any other subject access attributes to an
object it owns; in Figure 3, for example, S can grant any
type of access for SA to any subject. Rule 3 permits a sub
ject to delete any access attribute (or copy flag) from
the column of an object it owns, or the row of a subject
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it controls; in Figure 3, for example, S can delete any
entry from column Sa or S3 . In order to facilitate this, it
is required that 'control' be in ACS, S3 for every subject
S and rule R4 is included, which permits a subject to read
that portion of the access matrix which it owns or con
trols.
It should be noted that a subject may hold 'owner'
access to any object, but 'control' access only to sub
jects. It is assumed that each subject is owned or con
trolled by at most one other subject.
If one wants to limit the number of outstanding
access attributes to a given object, e. g. if it is
required that each subject be owned by at most one other
subject, or that a given object be accessible to a limited
number of subjects, a
'transfer-only' copy flag could be
introduced. Let's denote this flag by the symbol #. Then
in Rl the command to transfer 'a' (or a#) from SQ to S for
object X would be authorized if a# were in ACS0 , X3 and
would cause a# to be deleted from ACSa , X3 and 'a' (or a#)
be placed in ACS, X3.
The creation of a non-subject object, e.g. a file, is
straightforward, consisting of adding a new column to the
access matrix. The creator subject executes a command
(rule 5 of Table I) and is given 'owner' access to the
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newly created object. It then may grant access attributes
to other subjects for the object according to rule R2. The
destruction of an object, permitted only to its owner,
corresponds to deleting the column from the access matrix
(R6).
Creating a subject consists of creating a row and a
column for the new subject in the access matrix, giving
the creator 'owner' access to the new subject, and giving
the new subject 'control' access to itself (rule R7). The
destruction of a subject, permitted only to its owner,
corresponds to deleting both the row and the column from
the access matrix (rule R8) .
In the access matrix model described so far, the
entry 'a' in the intersection of a given subject row and
object column implies that this type of access is granted
automatically to the corresponding request. Fernandez,
Summers and Coleman CFERN753 extend this concept in order
to include arbitrary predicates which participate in the
decision. In other words, the entry in the intersection of
subject S and object X may contain a predicate P, that may
depend on any data in the system, that must be satisfied
in order for access of type 'a' to be granted. Access can
then be described as
a
> X
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Table I
Rule Command (by S, ) Authorization Operat ion
Rl transfer fa*] to S, X a* in ACS,, , X3 store la*\ in ACS, X3
R2 grant fa*) to S, X 'owner' in ACS , X3 storefa*} in ACS, X3
R3 delete a from S, X 'control' in ACS0
or
, S3 delete a from ACS, X3
'owner' in ACS , X3
R4 w = read S, X 'control' in ACSe
or
, S3 copy ACS,X3 into w
'owner' in ACS0 , X3
R5 create object X none add column for X to A;
store 'owner' in
ACS, X3
R6 destroy object X 'owner' in ACS , X3 delete column for X
from A
R7 create subject S none add row for S to A;
execute 'create object S'
store 'control' in ACS, S3
R8 destroy subject S
'owner' in ACS0, S3 delete row for S from A;
execute 'destroy object S'
i
In actual computer systems, the access matrix would
be very sparse if it were
implemented as a two dimensional
array. In most real world data processing situations the
number of users (subjects) would be substantial, and
the
number of objects would be extremely large. The
authoriza
tion matrix can usually be compressed
to a reasonable
size by some or all of the following
methods:
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(1) defining groups of "virtual' users, each representing
a group of users with identical security authoriza-
t ion.
(2) grouping the data elements (objects) into a number of
data security categories.
(3) storing a list of pairs (user, permission) for each
data element.
(4) storing a list of pairs ( data element, permission)
for each user.
The last two are to be covered next.
3. ! i. Authorization Uist
An authorization list (also called access-control
list) is a list of n subjects who are authorized to access
some particular object X. The i-th entry in the list gives
the name of a subject S*u and the right r^ in ACS, X3 of
the access matrix. An authorization list, therefore
represents the nonempty entries in column X of the access
matrix.
Authorization lists are typically used to protect
owned objects such as files. Each file has an authoriza
tion list specifying the names (or IDs) of users or user
groups and the access rights permitted to each (see Figure
45
5). The owner of a file has the sole authority to grant
access rights to the file to other users; no other user
with access to the file can confer these rights on another
user (the copy flag is off). The owner can revoke (or
decrease) the access rights of any user simply by deleting
(or modifying) the user's entry in the authorization list.
File directory
User Id Right
ART
PAT
ROY
SAM
Own, RW
RW
R
R
Authorization List for F
Figure 5
Authorization list for a file
3. 1 . 2. Cap.abi.iity List
The storage of access information by row is called a
'capability list' or C-list. A capability list is a pair
(X, r) specifying the unique name of an object X and a set
of access rights r for X (some capabilities also specify
an object's type). The capability is a ticket in that pos
session unconditionally authorizes the holder r-access to
X. Once the capability is granted, no further validation
of access is required.
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Right Object
A
RE
R
R
RW
A
B
C
D
Woceuure
V data B>
data C
C-l ist ~~-~-^ldata D
Figure 6
Capability List
The C-l ist for a subject S is a list of n capabili
ties for the objects S is permitted to access, where r
gives the rights in ACS, X^ 3 of the access matrix. The C-
list for S, therefore represents the nonempty entries in
row S of the access matrix. Figure 6 illustrates a C-l ist
that provides read /execute access (RE) to the procedure A,
read-only-access (R) to data objects B and C, and read-
write access (RW) to data object D.
3.2. Direct eg; Grajah Model
3. 2. 1- lake-Grant
Jones CJONE783 discussed the take-grant graph model
to describe a restricted class of protection system. As in
the access matrix model, a protection system is described
in terms of states and state transitions. A protection
state is described by a directed graph G, where the nodes
of the graph represent the active subjects and passive
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objects of the system. Subjects are represented by closed
circles as 0, and objects by open circles as O. Objects
not known to be either active or passive are notated with
slashed circles, Q) . Graphically, a right is notated by a
directed edge, labeled with a name. It is interpreted to
mean that the node at the tail of the edge has the named
right to the node at the head of the edge. The protection
state of a collection of subjects and objects is
represented as a finite graph; the graph is called a 'pro
tection graph'.
The graph in Figure 7 models a protection state in
which subject A has the right to perform operation Fa' on
subject B, which in turn has the right to perform ' b' on
passive objects X and Y. In addition, B has ' f ' right to
Y.
B^
b f
Figure 7
Protect ion stat e
Arcs can be labeled with multiple labels. If a
directed arc is to be added between two objects for which
an edge with the same direction already exists, a single
edge labeled with the union of the existing label (s) and
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the new label (s) is used.
The takegrant model is intended to model the access
control mechanism of a system. In a system, the protection
state changes only when some subject invokes an operation
that is defined as part of the protection mechanism. In
the take-grant system, these operations are modeled by a
set of rewriting rules for protection graph transitions.
Because the protection state changes only by action of a
subject, the model will refer to a subject f exercising'
its rights or privileges. Consequently, in the model any
graph rewriting rules will always require at least the
precence of a subject; usually a subject must have a par
ticular right to some object as a prerequisite for a graph
transit ion.
There are two special rights 'take', denoted by the
label 't', and 'grant', denoted by the label fg'. For the
definition of the four rewrite rules, let A, X, and Y be
three distinct vertices in a protection graph, such that A
is a subject.
Take: Let there be an edge from A to X with at least a
label 't', and an edge from X to Y with any label
or set of labels 'a'. Then applying the Take rule,
add an edge from A to Y having label 'a' : "A takes
the right to perform 'a' to Y from
X" (figure 8)
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-><Z> 2 CD
X
7
Y
Figure 8 - Take right
Grant: Let there be an edge from A to X with at least a
label fg', and an edge from A to Y labeled ra' .
Then applying the Grant rule, add an edge from X
to Y having label fa' : "A grants the right to per
form *a' over Y to X" (figure 9)
Figure 9 - Grant right
Create: Let A be a subject and fa' a subset of rights.
Applying the Create rule, add a new vertex N such
that pa' labels the edge from A to N: "A creates
the subject or object N with fa' right" (figure
10)
-><z>
A 7
A"
^N
Figure 10 - Create right
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Remove: Let there be an edge labeled ' f ' from subject A to
X. Let 'a' be any subset of rights. Applying the
Remove rule causes deletion of the 'a' labels from
*f. If f = a, then the edge itself is deleted: "A
removes its right to 'a' X" (figure 11)
^ cp m - - \xA 'X A 7 X
Figure 11 - Remove right
3. 2. 2. Grant-Revoke
Griffiths and Wade CGRIF763 used the directed graph
model to define a dynamic authorization mechanism. A data
base user can grant or revoke privileges (such as to read,
insert, or delete) on a file he has created. Furthermore,
he can authorize others to grant these same privileges.
The database system keeps track of a directed graph of
granted privileges.
The nodes of the graph correspond to users, and the
edges correspond to grants. The edges are of two types,
corresponding to whether or not the recipient of the grant
has been given the option to make further grants of this
privilege. For each pair of A, B of nodes, there can be no
more than one edge of each type from A to B.
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The representation of grants is straightforward, an
edge is drawn from node A to node B if node A is granting
P privileges to node B. The problem arises when some of
the privileges have to be removed. The decision about
exactly which privileges are to be revoked is not obvious.
One might expect that if the revokee possesses other
grants of the revoked right, then recursive revocation
should not take place. The problem is that such an algo
rithm does not detect cycles in the chain of grants fol
lowing the revokee. The revocation algorithm must distin
guish between the two cases shown in Figure 12. Effec
tively the correct algorithm traces the grant chain from X
back to the creator of the object. If every such path
passes through the revoker, then X's privileges should be
revoked. However, if there exists a path back to the crea
tor which does not pass through the revoker, then X should
retain the privileges after the revoke.
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/r20.
30_
40-"~^^
Figure 12
Effect of revocation of privileges
To decide whether to revoke recursively or not, each
edge is labeled with a timestamp. The timestamp may
represent real time or it may be a system maintained
counter- No two grant commands could be tagged with the
same timestamp. If the same privilege is granted by the
same grantor to the same user on the same object, then the
earlier timestamp is maintained. The duplicate later grant
is not recorded in the graph. This condition was proved by
Fagin CFAGI783 to be a flaw in the design since it could
forbid some user from exercising or granting a privilege
he "should" be allowed to exercise or grant.
Let's assume that user A is the creator of file f,
and that a number of grants, each with grant option (copy
flag on), of privileges P over file F take place as in
Figure 13(a). For example user A grants user B privilege P
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at time 10, user B grants user C privilege P at time 20,
and so on. Note that C grants D privilege P both at time
30 and at time 60. Under the original model the second
grant from C to D is ignored, and so, after time 60 only
the grants in Figure 13(b) are included in the graph.
Assume now that at time 70 user B revokes privilege P
from user C. On the original model the recursive revoca
tion will be as follows: On step 1 the grant from B to C
is deleted. Then, the earliest remaining grant to C has
timestamp 40. So on step 2, the revocation algorithm
deletes the grant from C to D, since the timestamp (30) of
this later grant is smaller that 40. Similarly, on the
last step, the grant from D to E is deleted. Thus, under
the original mechanism the final authorization graph will
look like Figure 13(c). In particular the system no longer
authorizes user D to exercise privilege P. However, user D
should be allowed privilege P, since there was a grant
from A to C at time 40, and from C to D at time 60.
Under the modified mechanism, on step 1 of the revo
cation mechanism, after the revocation by B at time 70,
the grant from B to C is deleted. Then the earliest
remaining grant to C has timestamp 40. So on step 2 the
grant from C to D with timestamp 30 is deleted (but the
grant from C to D with timestamp 60 is not deleted). On
the last step, the grant from D to E is deleted. The final
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Figure 13
Recursive revocation of privileges
resulting graph contains the grants in Figure 13(d). So
after time 70, user D is authorized to exercise (and to
grant) privilege P, as he should.
3. 3. Query Modification
The 'Query Modification' is a mechanism which is
applicable at a high-level, user interface. The basic
notion pursued is one of interaction modification. Users
interact with a database through a high-level query
language. Any such interaction is immediately modified
into an interaction which is compiled into a sequence of
simpler interactions, which are then executed without
further concern for access control.
Associated with each user is a list with entries of
the form (R, P) , where R is the name of a relation
(table), and P is a set of logical privileges or access
restrictions on R. The list is similar to a capability
list in that it defines a user's access rights to the
database. Each access restriction is of the form (f, S) ,
where S is an expression identifying a subset of R. It
authorizes the user to perform operation f on the subset
defined by S. If the user poses a query (f, R, E) the sys
tem modifies expression E according to the expression S.
That is, assume a list of restriction predicates pi,
p2, . . . pn. Then suppose the user issues a query G. The sys
tem changes the query into "Q & (pi I p2 I . . . I pn)
"
such
that only an authorized subset of what the user would have
retrieve is actually delivered to him. See Figure 14.
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al lowed
requested
Figure 1 4
Query modification access control scheme
For example consider the relation EMPLOYEE, with
attributes NAME, SALARY, MGR (manager), DEPT. A query to
retrieve the name and salary of all employees whose
manager is Jones would be:
Ql: RETRIEVE EMPLOYEE (NAME, SALARY) WHERE MGR - 'JONES'
Query Ql retrieves all tuples of EMPLOYEE that
satisfy the qualification (predicate). Suppose there is a
rule that permits the user to retrieve only the records of
employees in department Dl. Then the preceding request
would be modified to :
RETRIEVE EMPLOYEE (NAME, SALARY) WHERE MGR = 'JONES'
AND DEPT = 'Dl'
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3. 4. Lattice Model
The lattice model was motivated by the controls used
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other national
security agencies to regulate people's access to sensitive
information. The DOD information security policy gives
each document a classification level, L, and a (possibly
empty) set of categories, C. The security levels are
strictly ordered. The categories tend to have no ordering
or precedence, but subsets of categories are ordered by
set inclusion. The combination of a classification level
and a set of categories is referred to as an 'access
class'. Figure 15 identifies the DOD classification levels
and their order, and some examples of categories.
Top Secret ) Secret ) Confidential ) Unclassified
(a) Classification levels
Nuclear, Intelligence
(b) Example categories
Figure 15
DOD levels and categories
The classification levels and categories in the DOD
system are also used to label a set of clearances that can
be granted to users. There are two fundamental access
rules in the lattice model:
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(1) the 'simple security property' - no subject has read
access to any object that has a classification
greater that the clearance of the subject.
(2) the '*-property' (pronounced 'star-property' ) - no
subject has appendaccess to an object whose security
level is not at least the current security level of
the subject; no subject has read-write access to an
object whose security level is not equal to the
current security level of the subject; and no subject
has read access to an object whose security level is
not at most the current security level of the sub
ject.
A subject S may read an object 0 if
Ls 1 L0 & <C>S 3 (C>B
(a) Simple Security Property
A subject S may write an object 0 if
L ( L & <C>Q ^ -CO5 o S o
(b) *-property
Figure 16
Lattice Model Security Rules
Any attempt to apply the security lattice model to
non-DOD environments will try to identify levels and
categories that reflect the levels of sensitivity and
organizational division in the subject environment. For
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example, Figure 17 shows some possible levels and
categories identified in a corporation. The 'system-low'
level (SL) corresponds to unclassified in the DOD system,
and information at this level is readable by all users.
Security Levels: Audit-Manager (AM)
System-Low (SL)
Categories: Production-Data <PD)
Product ion-Code ( PC )
Development (D)
SystemDevelopment (SD)
Tools (T)
Figure 17
Levels and categories
The application of the access classes to the system's
subjects is outlined in Figure 18. Users, application
developers and system programmers each have system low
security level and two categories. In each case the first
category
'C3' is that of the information they manipulate
(read-write), and the second
' (> ' is that of the programs
the subjects can use. The audit and management subjects
have access to information of any category, and security
level of audit-manager. Finally a system control function
is defined with system low and access to each category,
and
'downgrade' privilege to change categories.
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Subjects Access Class
System management or Audit AM; any set of categories
User SL; CPD3 (PO
Application developers SL; CD3 (T>
System programmer SL; CSD3 (T>
System control SL; CPC, PD, D, SD, T3 plus
'downgrade' privilege
Figure 18
Users' Access Classes
The assingment of access classes to files (objects)
is given in Figure 19. The program objects (production
code, tools) each has a single category and are intended
to be read-only (unmodified). Objects that could be mani
pulated (production data, system and application programs
under development) have two categories each - that of the
object itself 'C3' and that of the program that operates
on it ' (> ' - so that a subject executing the program will
be allowed by the *-property to write the object. Audit
trial information is developed with the category ( ies) of
the activity being audited and is 'written
up' to the
higher audit-manager security level.
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Fill Access Class
Production data SL; CPD3 (PO
Production code SL; CPC3
Developing code/test data SL; CD3 (T>
Software tools SL; CT3
Systems programs in modification SL; CSD3 (T)
System programs SL
System and application AM; (appropriate categories)
Audit Trial
Figure 19
File Access Class Assingment
The overall effect of the configuration of access
classes described above is shown in Figure 20.
^~-~~~~-Qbject s
Sub.iec^fS -_
Prod.
Data
Prod.
Code
Dev.
Add. Pro-
Dev.
Sys. Pro. Tools
Sys
Pro.
Audit
Trail
System Mgt.
and Audit
R R R R R R RW
Product ion
users
RW R R W
Appl icat ion
Programmer
RW R R W
System
Programs
RW R R W
System
Control
RW RW RW RW RW RW W
Figure 20
Effect of Lattice Model specifications
4. Systems
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! INGRES
INGRES (Interactive Graphics and Retrieval System) is
a relational database system which is implemented on top
of the UNIX operating system. INGRES introduced a way to
implement fine grain access control using a technique
called 'Query Modification'. A brief description of the
INGRES system and its operational environment is first
presented to provide a background for the discussion of
the protection scheme.
The user interface for INGRES consists of the data
sublanguage QUEL (QUEry Language). QUEL is a complete
query language in that it frees the programmer from con
cern for how data structures are implemented and what
algorithms are operating on stored data. It is a nonpro
cedural language which has points in common with some
relational calculus based languages such as Data
Language/ALPHA. It does not use calculus quantifiers and
so, is considered by its designers to be a language based
on functions and not on a first order predicate calculus
CST0N76b3. The QUEL examples in this section concern the
following relations
EMPLOYEE (NAME, DEPT, SALARY, MANAGER, AGE)
DEPT (DEPT, FLOOR* )
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A QUEL interaction includes at least one RANGE state
ment of the form
RANGE OF variable-list IS relation-name
The purpose of this statement is to specify the rela
tion over which each variable ranges. The interaction also
includes one or more statements of the form:
Command (target-list) CWHERE qual if icat ion3
Here, 'Command' is either RETRIEVE, APPEND, REPLACE,
or DELETE. For example, a query to retrieve the names and
salaries of all employees whose manager is JONES would be:
RANGE OF E IS EMPLOYEE
RETRIEVE (E. NAME, E. SALARY)
WHERE E. MGR = ' JONES'
In addition to the above QUEL commands INGRES also
supports a variety of utility commands. The only ones of
interest in a protection context are COPY, PRINT and
CREATE. The COPY command transfers a relation to or from a
UNIX file. It is a 'bulk transfer' mechanism and therefore
must be protected. PRINT is a simple report generator that
writes a relation onto a user's terminal. CREATE sets up
an empty relation and prepares it for use.
INGRES manages a collection of databases, each of
which is made up of a set of relations. Each database is
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associated with a special user called the Data Base
Administrator (DBA). A list of allowable DBAs is kept in
INGRES.
Only a database's DBA may create shared relations in
that database. Relations created by other users are
guaranteed private by INGRES. The invoker of the CREATE
command becomes the 'owner' of the relation created. A
user may only destroy a relation he owns.
INGRES makes available to the DBA the following com
mand to specify access permission for shared relations:
PERMIT relname TO object FOR command
(target list; idlist) WHERE qualification
The fields of this command have the following mean
ing:
relname: specifies the name of the relation to be pro
tected
object: specifies the object to be controlled. This may
be a user, a teletype, or the keyword ALL,
which will cause the restriction to apply to
all users.
command: specifies which type of access is to be
allowed. The types of access allowed are
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RETRIEVE, APPEND, DESTROY, REPLACE, DELETE,
COPY and PRINT, or the keyword ALL.
target list: a list of domains of the form tuple-
variable, domain which may be accessed.
idlist: a list of domains of the form tuple-
variable, domain which can be accessed but not
updated. These domains may appear in a qualifi
cation clause of an update, but may not appear
in the target list. This field is optional.
However, only one tuple variable can be
presented in the target list and idlist.
qualification: any valid QUEL qualification containing
any number of tuple-variables. It specifies the
subset of the relation which may be accessed by
an interaction of the type specified by 'com
mand'
. A pound symbol (#) may appear in the
qualification to specify the UNIX logon name of
the user currently invoking INGRES.
The database administrator can enter an arbitrary
number of protection statements governing access to his
relations. Each protection statement is given a unique ID
and stored in the PROTECTION relation. This relation has
domains of relation name, command, object,
target- list,
idlist, qualification, protect ionid. This relation is
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normally compressed and hashed on the first two domains.
Removal of protection statements is accomplished by the
DBA using the utility command
DENY (protection-id).
Relations owned by other users are guaranteed private
by INGRES. Therefore only the DBA is permitted the use of
the PERMIT command. Since system catalogs contain data
about the database, their integrity must be carefully
guarded. Consequently no user (including the DBA) is
allowed to update system catalogs using QUEL. However,
RETRIEVE permission to a portion of a catalog may be
granted to others by the DBA.
In summary the DBA has the following powers not
available to ordinary users:
(1) the ability to create shared relations and to specify
access control for them.
(2) the ability to destroy any relation in his database
(except the system catalogs).
This system allows 'one-level' sharing in that only
the DBA has the above powers and he cannot delegate then
to others. The designers' arguments to support this cen
tralized control were:
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(1) Additional generality would have created considerable
problems, such as making revocation of privileges
nontrivial.
(2) It seems appropriate to entrust to the DBA the duty
(and power) to resolve the policy decision which must
be made when space is exhausted and some relations
must be destroyed (or archived). This policy decision
becomes much harder (or impossible) if a database is
not in control of one user.
(3) Someone must be entrusted with the policy decision
concerning which relations to physically store and
which to define as 'views'. This "database design"
problem is best resolved by a centralized DBA.
INGRES requests are analyzed and validated at execu
tion time, one statement at a time. The implementation of
access control has two major facets. The first is the
representation of information in the PROTECTION relation
(see figure 21). If data were stored in a text string, the
string would have to be completely parsed for each
interaction to which it applies. The overhead of this
strategy is considered unreasonable.
63
User- QUEL
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Mod i fv
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DBA
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Convert to
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Figure 21
INGRES access control
Consequently a protection statement will be parsed
when entered and stored as a tree structure in the PROTEC
TION relation. When an interaction is to be modified, the
qualification trees of the protection interaction need
only be attached to the qualification tree of the user's
interaction. The ID and target lists are stored as a list
of domain numbers which are then internal representation
for domain names.
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The second facet of the implementation is the
enforcing of the protection interaction. This is done by
the following algorithm:
(1) Find all attributes in the target list on the unmodi
fied qualification statement of the interaction. Call
this set S.
(2) Find all access control interactions whose command
type and object match those of the user's interaction
and with a target list containing all attributes in
S. Denote this by T. If there is not such set T, the
query is aborted due to lack of permission.
(3) Ignore any access rules in T whose target list con
tains the target lists of other rules in T. That is,
find the smallest target lists that cover the
request. Call the qualification of the remaining
rules P1, . . . , Ph .
(4) Replace the request qualification Qr, by
Q^ AND (Q} OR Q^ OR ... OR Q)
(5) Execute the modified interaction normally.
What this algorithm means is that all rules relevant
to the request are first located. It is then assumed that
rules are well nested, that is, Rule A is more restrictive
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than Rule B if Rule B authorizes access to a subset of
attributes in Rule A. Only the most restrictive rules are
retrieved for the query modification.
The following example illustrates the algorithm:
Ex. Each manager can read salaries of employees
who work for him
Protection interaction:
RANGE OF E IS EMPLOYEE
PERMIT ALL TO EMPLOYEE FOR RETRIEVE
(E. SALARY; E. NAME)
WHERE E. MANAGER - #
An interaction by Jones:
RETRIEVE (E. SALARY)
WHERE E. NAME - "SMITH"
would by modified to:
RETRIEVE (E. SALARY)
WHERE E. NAME "SMITH"
AND E. MANAGER = "JONES"
In INGRES the objects protected by the access control
rules are always real relations. This is a different
approach from other systems which provide access control
to virtual relations, or views. The following example
illustrates the rationale behind this design decision:
Consider the following two views:
RANGE OF E IS EMPLOYEE
DEFINE RESTRICTION-1 (E. NAME, E. SALARY, E. AGE)
WHERE E. DEPT = "toy"
DEFINE RESTRICTION-2 (E. NAME, E. DEPT, E. SALARY)
WHERE E. AGE ( 50
and the following two access control statements:
RANGE OF E IS EMPLOYEE
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PERMIT ALL TO EMPLOYEE FOR RETRIEVE
(E. NAME, E. SALARY, E. AGE)
WHERE E. DEPT = "toy"
PERMIT ALL TO EMPLOYEE FOR RETRIEVE
(E. NAME, E. SALARY, E. DEPT)
WHERE E. AGE ( 50
Access control could be based on views, where a given
user may be authorized to use views RESTRICTION-1 and
RESTRICTION-2. To find the salary of Smith he might intei
rogate RESTRICTION-1 as follow:
RANGE OF R IS RESTRICTION-1
RETRIEVE (R. SALARY)
WHERE R. NAME = "Smith"
Failing to find Smith in RESTRICTION-1, he would have
then to interrogate RESTRICTION-2. After two queries he
would be returned the appropriate salary if Smith was
under 50 or in the toy department. Under the INGRES scheme
the user can issue:
RANGE OF E IS EMPLOYEE
RETRIEVE (E. SALARY)
WHERE E. NAME "Smith"
which will be modified by the access control algorithm to
RANGE OF E IS EMPLOYEE
RETRIEVE (E. SALARY)
WHERE E. NAME - "Smith"
AND
(E. AGE ( 50 or E. DEPT "toy")
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In this system the user need not manually sequence
through his views to obtain such data if permitted. Note
clearly that the portion of EMPLOYEE to which the user has
access (the union of RESTRICTION-1 and RESTRICTION-2) is
not a relation and hence cannot be defined as a single
view.
To summarize, access control restrictions are handled
automatically by the INGRES algorithm. In a view oriented
scheme, a user must sequence through his views to obtain
allowed information.
4. 2. DB2
DB2 (Data Base 2) is a subsystem of IBM's MVS operat
ing system. It is a relational database management system
(DBMS) for that operating system. Any given DB2 applica
tion, that is, any application program that accesses one
or more DB2 databases, will execute under the control of
exactly one of the three subsystems IMS, CICS, or TSO.
The user interface to DB2 is the SQL language (Struc
tured Query Language). SQL is a relational nonprocedural
data sublanguage with ideas both from the relational cal
culus and the relational algebra. However, it does not
make use of calculus quantifiers or other mathematical
concepts, rather it is a structured query language with
English keywords. SQL can be used in both interactive and
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embedded environments, and it provides both data defini
tion and data manipulation functions. The major data
definition functions are:
CREATE TABLE DROP TABLE
CREATE VIEW DROP VIEW
CREATE INDEX DROP INDEX
The data manipulation functions are:
SELECT UPDATE DELETE INSERT
For example, a SELECT statement has the form:
SELECT column-list
FROM relname
WHERE condition
where:
column-list: specifies the columns of the target result
which is always a table (null, one row, or
many rows). An asterisk (*) could be used to
retrieve all columns of the relation.
relname: specifies the table(s) from which the target
result is to be obtained.
condition: specifies the logical condition(s) or predi
cates on which the result is to be obtained.
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Consider the following relations:
EMPLOYEE (NAME, DEPT, SALARY, MANAGER, AGE)
DEPT (DEPT, FLOOR#)
A query to retrieve the names and salaries of all employ
ees whose manager is Jones would be:
SELECT NAME, SALARY
FROM EMPLOYEE
WHERE MANAGER = "JONES";
There are two more or less independent features in
the system that are involved in the provision of security
in DB2: (1) the view mechanism, which can be used to hide
sensitive data from unauthorized users, and (2) the
authorization subsystem, which allows users having
specific privileges selectively and dynamically to grant
those privileges to other users, and subsequently revoke
them if desired.
Once the policy decisions, as to which specific
privileges should be granted to which specific users are
made, DB2 enforces them in the following way:
(a) The results of those decisions are made known to the
system by means of the GRANT and REVOKE statements,
and are remembered by the system by saving them in
the catalog.
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(b) It provides a means of checking a given access
request against the applicable authorization con
straints (here 'access request' refers to the combi
nation of requested operation plus target object plus
requesting user). Most of the checking is done by
BIND at the time the original request is bound.
(c) Provides a means to recognize the source of the
request. This is done by the authorization ID
assigned to each user.
In order to simplify the operation of granting many
different privileges to different users, DB2 provides a
hierarchy of authorization levels that can be assigned to
system administrators, database administrators, applica
tion programmers, operators and others. These are called
administrative authorities. Thus, in DB2 there are two
kinds of authorities: individual authorities and adminis
trative authorities. Those who are granted administrative
authorities possess the individual authorities that encom
pass them, but they also possess other authorities that
cannot be granted individually.
A brief description of each administrative authority
fol lows:
(a) Super SYSADM (Super System Administrator) - the user
designated as super system administrator during the
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installation process is at the head of the authoriza
tion structure in DB2. The Super SYSADM has total
control over all DB2 resources. No other user can
revoke SYSADM authority from the Super SYSADM.
(b) SYSADM (System Administrator) - this is the highest
level of administrative authority. Persons having
SYSADM authority have total control over all DB2
resources (except certain critical subsystem table
spaces and indexes that are only recoverable by the
Super SYSADM) . They can grant and revoke any of the
other levels of authority and can grant any particu
lar individual authority to any user and revoke any
authority granted by any other user.
(c) DBADM (Data Base Administrator) - users with this
administrative authority have total control over a
particular DB2 database and have capabilities on
objects within the database. A user can have DBADM
authority over more than one database.
(d) DBCTRL (Data Base Control) - users having DBCTRL have
all the capabilities of the DBADM except that they
cannot automatically access the data in the database.
(e) DBMAINT (Data Base Maintenance) - users with DBMAINT
authority have the readonly privileges of DBCTRL.
This level of authorization is meant for personnel
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who perform such tasks as running utilities to make
image copies and obtain statistics.
(f) SYSOPR (System Operator) - This level of administra
tive authority is meant for system operators who
issue DB2 operator commands, but have no access to
databases.
These authority levels allow system administrators
to separate the task of database administration on a
database-by-database level. Different groups can adminis
ter their own data without affecting any other database.
The distribution of authority is a policy decision. It's
up to the administrators to use the capability to distri
bute authorization that DB2 offers, or to have it central
ized.
Users of DB2 that do not hold any of the special
administrative authorities can create an object if they
have been granted the authority to create that type of
object. Regardless of how users gain the authority to
create objects (tables, table spaces, indexes, etc.), they
have full access to the objects they create, even if they
do not have any of the administrative authorities.
As already mentioned, all users are identified by
authorization IDs. A single user can have more than one
authorization ID and, conversely, several users can share
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one authorization ID. To use any DB2 capability a user
must be granted that privilege, and the privilege is
granted to the user's authorization ID. A user's authori
zation ID entitles the user to ownership of the data in
the objects he creates plus ownership of certain
privileges. In addition, any privilege on the object can
be granted to another user. Also, at the creator's option,
privileges can be granted such that the grantee may in
turn grant privileges to other users.
Access to DB2 resources is controlled by means of the
GRANT and REVOKE statements. The GRANT statement enables
you to give users certain privileges. The REVOKE statement
enables you to take these privileges away. Only a
privilege that has been specifically granted can be
revoked. Instead of granting privileges to authorization
IDs, as indicated above, you can also grant privileges to
PUBLIC, which means that all users are granted those
privileges. When a privilege is revoked from PUBLIC,
Authoriation IDs that were specifically granted that
privilege will still retain that privilege.
The general form of GRANT is:
GRANT some-privilege ON some-resource TO some-auth-ID
CWITH GRANT 0PTI0N3
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The "WITH GRANT OPTION", if indicated, enables the
grantee to further grant this privilege to other users.
There are five forms of the SQL GRANT statement, and five
forms of the corresponding REVOKE statements. The five
forms that enable you to grant and and revoke privileges,
and some examples of each one, follow:
(1) GRANT or REVOKE TABLE PRIVILEGES
- Retrieve data from a table or view (SELECT)
- Insert new rows in a table or view (INSERT)
- Delete rows from a table or view (DELETE)
- Update columns of a table or view (UPDATE)
- Create indexes for columns of a table (INDEX)
- Alter a table (ALTER)
(2) GRANT or REVOKE PLAN PRIVILEGES
- Use a BIND, REBIND, or FREE subcommand
Run programs associated with a specified
application plan (EXECUTE)
(3) GRANT or REVOKE SYSTEM PRIVILEGES
- Create databases and have DBADM authorization
over the database created (CREATEDBA)
(4) GRANT or REVOKE DATABASE PRIVILEGES
- DBADM, DBCTRL and DBMAINT administrative
authorit ies
- Operator commands to start, stop, and
display a database (STARTDB, STOPDB,
DISPLAYDB)
- Create a table (CREATETAB)
- Drop a database (DROP)
- Use DB2 utilities to:
- load table spaces and indexes (LOAD)
- recover table spaces and indexes (RECOVERDB)
(5) GRANT or REVOKE USER PRIVILEGES
- Authority to use a buffer pool
- Authority to use a table space
There are certain actions a user can perform (such as
dropping a table) for which no explicit authority can be
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granted. The appropriate authorization IDs possess these
privileges implicitly. A table can only be dropped by its
creator, someone who has SYSADM authority, or by someone
who has DBADM authority over the database that contains
the table.
In addition to the authority hierarchy described, DB2
provides another feature to control access to data: the
view mechanism. Anyone who creates a table can create a
view of it. Also, a user can create views based on tables
created by other users, provided he has SELECT privileges
over those tables. The creator of a view is granted only
the capabilities on the view that he or she holds on the
table or tables on which it is based.
When a view is created DB2 inserts information in the
authorization table of the catalog, for each table used by
the view, as to which privileges the creator has on the
view. When a user's authorization to use a table changes,
the system checks the authorization table to see whether
the user created a view based on that table. If a
privilege is lost from the table, it will also be lost
from the view. If as a result of this update, the user no
longer has SELECT privilege on the view, the system
deletes the view.
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When a view is dropped, it does not affect the table
(or tables) on which the view is based. However, when a
view or table is dropped, the system will also automati
cally drop all views that are dependent on the views or
tables being dropped.
DB2' s catalog contains a series of system tables
which maintain information about objects. Every time an
object is created, DB2 makes appropriate entries in the
catalog; a description of the object is entered along with
crossreference information showing how the object relates
to other objects. The tables of interest to us are the
ones that keep information about authorization. Some of
these are:
SYSDBAUTH - identifies the privileges held by users
over databases.
SYSTABAUTH - records the privileges held by users on
tables and views.
SYSCOLAUTH - records the UPDATE privileges held by users
on individual columns in a table or view.
Entries are made in the table only when a
GRANT statement specifies a column list fol
lowing UPDATE authority.
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SYSPLANAUTH - records the privileges held by users on
application plans.
SYSUSERAUTH - records the system privileges held by
users.
In general, the relation SYSTABAUTH consists of
USERID, TNAME, TYPE, UPDATE GRANTOP, PRIV
which have the following meaning:
USERID - is the user who is authorized to perform the
action recorded in PRIV on the relation TNAME.
TNAME - is the name of the table (relation) to which
USERID has been granted access to.
TYPE - indicates whether TNAME refers to a base rela
tion (TYPE = R) or to a view (TYPE = V).
UPDATE - indicates whether the user USERID may perform
this action on all columns of the relation (UPDATE
= ALL), on some columns (UPDATE = SOME), or on
none (UPDATE = NONE) .
GRANTOP - indicates whether the privileges are grantable
or not .
PRIV - is a sequence of columns, one for each
privilege, which indicates (Y or N) whether the
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corresponding privilege may be exercise or not. In
addition, a time stamp is kept in order to be able
to control revocation of privileges.
For each (user, table) pair there are zero, one or
two entries in SYSTABAUTH. There are zero entries if there
are no privileges, one if the privileges are either with
or without grant-option, and two if there are some
privileges with and some without grant-option, in which
case there is one tuple for all privileges with grant-
option and one tuple for all without. The entry in SYS-
COLAUTH is needed only if UPDATE = SOME, meaning that
there are some columns on which the user USERID may exer
cise the privileges and there are others in which he may
not. SYSCOLAUTH is used to record precisely on which
columns that may be done: for each updatable column a
tuple of the form
(user, table, column, grantor, grantopt)
is in SYSCOLAUTH.
Every time a GRANT command is issued, the system ver
ifies whether the grant is authorized. If it is, either a
new tuple is inserted in SYSTABAUTH or an old one is modi
fied; the action on SYSCOLAUTH occurs according to the
UPDATE field of the corresponding SYSTABAUTH tuple.
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4. 3. System/38
The IBM System/38 is a general-purpose data process
ing system designed to provide a high-level machine intei
face. It supports advanced database and interactive work
station applications as well as traditional batch applica
tions. The system's interface has an object-oriented
architecture. Objects are the means through which informa
tion is stored and processed on the system. An object is
defined as a named entity that is described by its set of
attributes; the attributes define a set of functions or
operations that can be performed on the object.
There are three basic user interfaces on System/38:
the Control Language, RPG III, and data description
specifications. Control Language (CL) allows for the
establishment and control of the processing environment
and provides an interface to many system dependent func
tions. RPG III allows the user to write a program such
that objects like database files, work station files, and
external data areas are not defined in the program. I/O
operations are specified in the program, but the object
structures (down to the field level) are defined via a
separate interface. This separate interface is the 'data
description specification'. It serves only as a descrip
tive interface since the actual object creation can only
be affected via a CL command.
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One of the main characteristics of System/38 is that
it is object oriented. A description of the objects that
could be defined in the system follows. Then we'll analyze
how these objects are related to enforce access control
rules.
Objects are devided into two classes of objects: sys
tem objects and program objects.
(1) System objects
(a) Data Space: serves as the basic unit of storage for
a user's data. It consists of a collection of
entries, each of which may contain a given number
of similarly formated data fields.
(b) Cursor: provides access to the entries residing
within a data space. A cursor is the user's only
interface to these entries.
(c) Context: is an object that contains addressability
by name, type, and subtype to other system objects.
(d) Access group: enables a user to specify (as a
group) those system objects that are used together.
(e) Data Space Index: object that is used to provide a
logical ordering of the entries in a data space.
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(f) Program: object that forms the basic executable
unit of the machine.
(g) User Profile: object that identifies a valid user
to the machine. A user profile also identifies the
user's rights to use the system objects, machine
resources, privileged instructions, special machine
instructions, and certain machine attributes.
Each system object must be explicitly created. There
are specific Create instructions (for example, Create Cur
sor and Create Context) for each type of system object. A
system pointer provides addressability to a system object.
That is, in order to reference a system object for any
operation, a system pointer must be specified as an
operand of the instruction or implied as a field in a tem
plate.
(2) Program objects
(a) Data Object: object that provides operational and
possibly representational characteristics to byte
strings in spaces for use as instruction opera
tions. There are two classes of data objects:
- Scalar data object: provides support for opera
tions on values in space.
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- Pointer Data Object: provides addressability to
both program and system objects.
(b) Constant Data Object: defines a scalar data view
that remains the same throughout the existence of a
program.
(c) Entry Point: references an instruction as a target
of the program invocation function.
A program object is created by the execution of the
Create Program instruction. This instruction causes an
object to be defined in the Object Definition Table (ODT) .
The entry in the Object Definition table that describes a
program object is called a 'view'. A view defines the
type, attributes, functional location, and, possibly, a
permanent value or an initial value of the object.
Once an object is created, its internal stored format
is not apparent to the user. The status and values of the
object may be retrieved or changed by using interface
instructions, but the internal format of the object cannot
be d i rect 1 y v i ewed or mod i f i ed .
Although the database supports security only on the
object level, differences in the authorization required to
use a Create Cursor instruction allow the implementation
of field level security through the use of a subset of the
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fields. When a cursor is created to use a data space, the
user must provide another description called the 'mapping
template'. The mapping template describes how a user wants
the entries to appear to the user program. The user may
provide two mapping templates when the transformation of
data is different for retrieval than for insert or update.
Cursors can be created over multiple data spaces.
Following is a discussion of the kinds of access or
authorities a user can possess over the objects described.
(1) Object Authorization - Instructions that involve sys
tem objects usually require certain authorities to
those objects. During the execution of a program,
instructions may require one or more of the following
specific object authorities, which can be granted to
users in any combination:
(a) Public Authority - can be used to control access by
all users to the objects in the system. Three lev
els are available: ALL, eliminates security checks,
all users can access the object; NO, only the
object owner or other users whose profile contains
a specific authority for that object can access it;
NORMAL, allows all users to perform normal opera
tions associated with the object, for example, nor
mal operation for a program would be execution but
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not deleting or modifying.
(b) Object Management - required to control the acces
sibility and availability of system objects, for
example: modify addressability, grant /retract
authority, create cursor, modify attributes.
(c) Data-related Authorities - control reading, writ
ing, and general usage of system objects, for exam
ple: retrieve, insert, delete, update, authorized
pointer, execute-only (for programs).
(2) Special authorizations - allow use of certain impli
cit authorities (that are not necessarily associated
with one specific instruction or object), function
authorities, and machine attribute modification
authority.
(a) All-object authority - provides authority to use
any object in the machine without public or private
object authorization being granted to the object.
(b) Load - allows the user to copy an object from a
load/dump media onto the machine.
(c) Dump - allows the user to copy an object from the
machine to a load /dump media.
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(3) Resource authorization - controls the amount of sys
tem resources that the user can utilize.
(4) Privileged Instructions - used to restrict creation
or attribute modification of certain types of system
objects for example: Create User Profile, Modify User
Profile, Initiate Process, Terminate Machine Process
ing.
(5) Owned Objects - certain authorities are implied to
the owner of a system object.
A prerequisite for authority verification is the
identification of the user. This is satisfied through the
use of an object called the User Profile, which identifies
the user and the user's authority. A user profile has a
name, type, and subtype that identifies a user to the
machine in one of the following manners:
All users of the system can be identified to the sys
tem by the same user profile.
. A group of users can share a single user profile.
Each user of the system can have a unique user pro
file.
Two levels of users can be defined:
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(1) System Security Officer - the system security off
icers have ultimate control of the use of the system.
They can create a user profile and grant or revoke
authority of that user to access any object or system
funct ion.
(2) User - whenever a users create objects, they become
the owners of those objects. They have complete con
trol over the objects. They can perform all of the
functions of the officer in granting or revoking
authority over the objects they own.
Each process in the machine executes under control of
a user profile. When the machine executes an instruction,
references an object, or requests a resource, it is done
in the name of the user. Therefore, the user profile asso
ciated with a process is checked for the authority to use
that item. When a process creates a permanent system
object, the user profile associated with the process is
assigned ownership of and all rights to that object. Tem
porary objects are not owned by any user profile, instead,
all object authorities are granted to the public.
In addition to the authority provided by the process
user profile, a process can
'adopt' other user profiles
and, therefore, use any additional authority available to
these user profiles. When a program is created, the crea-
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tor can specify that the program is to have the adopted
user profile attribute. He can also specify that it is to
have the 'propagate adopted user profile' attribute, these
causes the adopted user profile to be available to other
programs called by the program with these attributes.
The symbolic address of an object used for address
resolution may be qualified by a minimum authority
requirement. If the authorities in the user profile does
not agree with this minimum requirement, no access is per
mitted, and the system continues the search for other
objects with the proper type, subtype, name, and authoi
ity.
The right to use a system object is monitored by the
machine. Object authorization is implemented in microcode
below the lowest user-available interface. The objects are
stored in auxiliary storage, but there is no interface
available to the user for reading from, or writing to,
this medium. All operations are made through well-defined,
object-sensitive, microcode instruction interfaces which
enforce object authorization.
In order to reference a system object for any opera
tion, a system pointer must be specified as an operand of
the instruction or implied as a field in a template. When
the pointer is first referenced the machine searches the
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entries of one or more contexts (which contain object
names and locations) in order to locate the specified
name. Once found, the resulting object location is stored
in the pointer, thereby, eliminating subsequent searches
(see figure 22).
System/38 instruction
OP code
Operand
Unresolved
system pointer ^
Context
search
Synchroni zat ion
\
Resolved
system pointer
Access by
other processes
User Profiles
Narne-
- location
'Object i Author ity
location/
|
y Authority
l
\
Figure 22
The object access path
For efficiency, the authority available to a user can
be stored in the system pointer to
the object. If the
required authorization is contained in the pointer no
further authorization checking is required. The user con
trols system pointer authority.
The authority is not
stored in the pointer unless the
process has 'authorized
pointer
object' authorization to that object. Storing
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authority in the pointer has performance benefits, but it
also has some functional disavantages. A system pointer
with the authority attribute can be copied outside the
process and therby cause implicit granting of authority to
another process that may use the pointer or a copy of the
pointer- Also, the authorization pointer can be saved
indefinitely, this causes the Retract Authority instruc
tion to be ineffective for such cases.
Pointers are protected against modification. A
pointer is an object that is used only for addressing and
does not permit examination or manipulation of the implied
physical address. Direct modification of a pointer via a
'computational' instruction results in the pointer becom
ing invalid and no longer usable for addressing purposes.
4. 4. Comparison of systems
Both INGRES and DB2 protection systems allow selec
tive control of access to logical database subsets. Both
schemes allow the designer of protection specifications to
describe the logical database subset in high level,
nonprocedural terms. That is, tools are provided to allow
protection specifications to be written without requiring
the specifier to write programs in a general purpose pro
gramming language. INGRES and DB2 use QUEL and SQL predi
cate expression capabilities, respectively, to facilitate
this.
In INGRES, the qualification clause of a protection
statement is used to identify a logical subset of the
relation. QUEL allows selective access to column subsets
via the specification of accessible columns. Access can be
controlled in terms of the columns that are allowed to
appear in the target list of an interaction as well as
those that are allowed to appear in the qualification part
of the interaction. QUEL protection statements are used to
control access to information in a single relation only,
although the subset of a relation that is accessible can
be defined in terms of data in other relations.
In DB2, access control specifications for specific
columns and rows of a table are described in terms of
'views', rather than in terms of base relation subsets.
Each view has an associated definition that specifies how
the view is constructed from the underlying relation(s).
Row subsets of relations (and views) can, thus be speci
fied. All columns of a view are readable to a user who has
the appropriate privilege (read access to the view).
A subset of the columns of a view can be specified as
those the user can update. In addition to the ability to
define a view that is a row and/or column subset of a
relation, one can define a view that summarizes the infor-
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mat ion in a relation. For example, a statistical view of
the EMPLOYEE relation can be defined that has the sum of
employee salaries by department (common value of Depart
ment). It is also possible to define a view that combines
the information in two individual relations, e.g., the
join of EMPLOYEE and DEPT on common Department.
Unlike INGRES, DB2' s access privileges can grant
access to information derived from base relations without
necessarily granting access to the base relations them
selves. In both INGRES and DB2, an interaction (query or
update request) that involves more than one relation is
constrained by the intersection of the relevant privileges
on those relations. In INGRES, all relations involved in
the interaction are base relations, whereas in DB2 one or
more of them can be a view.
In supporting views, DB2 in effect handles many of
the types of problems that can also be handled by limiting
the operations a user can invoke. However, neither DB2,
nor INGRES explicitly provide for control on the types of
operations (transactions) a given user is allowed to per
form. No consideration is given to the need to control
what a user can do with data after it is released to him.
In System/38 indirect access control is achieved also
by the definition of logical files (views). Once these
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files are created users are given access rights to them.
These logical files are defined in a similar way as DB2
views, in that they can be formed of a subset of columns
or rows. But, like INGRES, they are based only on physical
files. No logical files can be defined over other logical
files.
DB2 and System/38 approach to controlling access to
aggregate quantities (e.g., the average employee salary)
is to allow a user access to a view (or logical file)
created for each relevant aggregate (e. g. , one for the
average employee salary, one for the salary total, etc.).
INGRES handles access to aggregates in a more restrictive
way: if the user does not have access to the data under
lying the aggregate (e.g., access to all employee
salaries, if he wants to ask for the average employee
salary), then either:
(1) he can be allowed to examine aggregate information
only if the aggregate is taken over a complete rela
tion, or
(2) the aggregate is modified so that it ranges over a
subset of the underlying relation to which the user
has access.
The database administrator decides for each aggregate
type which of the two above alternatives is to apply.
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DB2, INGRES, and System/38 allow access privileges to
be dynamically issued and revoked. For the revocation of
access privileges to be immediate, each access to the data
must be checked for authority. In DB2, revocation does not
actually have an effect on a user until after the transac
tion he is currently executing has completed. This is done
because of the desire to make the transaction the basic
unit of consistency, concurrency, recovery, and authoriza
tion in DB2, and because it is desirable to minimize the
number of authority checks the protection system must per
form.
Because it is not transaction oriented, INGRES
revokes access from a user after the current interaction
is completed.
In System/38 some problems may arise if the authori
zation information is stored in the system pointer. Since
this pointer could be indefinitely saved, the authoriza
tion could be in the system even if it has been removed
from the user profile.
The ability to dynamically issue and change protec
tion specifications in INGRES is centralized: the database
administrator creates and issues all protection statements
on shared relations. The ability to control protection
specifications in DB2 is distributed: any user can create
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a relation and grant access privileges on it. A user can
furthermore pass on the ability to grant a privilege to
another user (the "grant option", which is related to the
"copy flag").
In the INGRES scheme the database administrator can
be a potential bottleneck if protection specifications are
rather highly dynamic. The database administrator is given
an excessive amount of power, which is not consistent with
the concept of separation of privileges (i.e. distributing
power). The centralized approach may, however, be
appropriate in a given application environment: the data
base administrator can balance conflicting requirements.
DB2 avoids this problem, but at the expense of added over
head (e.g., in revocation). The INGRES centralized
approach has one additional advantage: it prevents the
user from copying data to which he has access and subse
quently granting access to it to others (who presumably
should not be allowed such access).
System/38 provides also distributed authorization in
that users can grant privileges to other users over
objects they own. But there is a central security officer
or DBA who controls all objects in the system and who has
ultimately authorization over them.
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The DB2 and INGRES protection schemes are based on
the user oriented data selection and modification
languages SQL and QUEL, respectively. The advantages and
disadvantages of these two languages are to some extent
inherited by the corresponding protection system. Both
systems have relatively simple protection mechanisms,
which is a plus with regard to the effectiveness of the
user interface.
Both DB2 and INGRES protection systems are basically
access control list systems, because they maintain lists
of which users have which access privileges. In DB2, the
user is responsible for choosing the correct view for his
interaction. He can obtain different access rights if he
phrases his interaction in terms of one view than he would
obtain if he phrases it (equivalent ly) in terms of
another. By contrast INGRES automatically determines
which access privileges are relevant to a given interac
tion; the user has no choice to make. The apparent trade
off is between the flexibility of the DB2 approach and the
ability of INGRES to automatically determine all relevant
access rights for a given interaction.
System/38 takes a different approach, it utilizes the
capability list technique. On each user profile there is a
list of the objects the user is allowed to access together
with the corresponding authorities he has to each object.
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In the INGRES scheme, the need for a larger number of
protection statements with a large number of interactions
is a problem. For example, it is required that the protec
tion statements for a user be properly "nested": the more
columns named in the protection statement (present in the
target list and qualification column list), the more res
trictive is the allowed access. In INGRES, it is necessary
to repeat the complete specification of an access right
for each user to whom it is to be given, whereas in DB2
each distinct view is defined only once.
Due to use of query modification, an INGRES user can
be supplied with an answer to a question different from
the one he asked; the user should normally be notified of
this difference. For example, a request for the average
employee salary may be modified to yield the average
salary of employees in the toy department only. DB2 takes
the approach of reporting all protection violations to the
user, denying him the requested access.
In System/38 logical files are defined only once, but
since it uses the capability list, authorization specifi
cations for each object is entered on each user profile.
One way to minimize this repetition is by defining users
in groups and assigning a user profile for the group. All
members of the group have the same access privileges to
the specified objects.
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DB2, INGRES, and System/38 have fail safe protection
defaults, in that the default is to deny access if the
required privileges are not explicitly present.
INGRES, DB2, and System/38 rely on the operating sys
tem on which they are built for user authentication, and
reliability of operation. The operating system is also
relied upon for primary memory protection (e.g., clearing
storage residues), controlling the hardware for reliabil
ity, etc.
5. Conclusions
5. 1. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented the techniques that has been
used to model protection requirements, in particular,
access control information in a database management sys
tem. These tools aid the designer to express the relation
ship between the components of a security system, e.g.,
users (subjects), objects, and the set of rules that
governs who can access which data. These models should
help him find the best way to enforce the security
requirements at the time of implementation.
The access matrix has shown to be a good means to
view all objects, subjects , and the rules that relate
them. But precisely because it is a view of every com-
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ponent, it can be too sparse to implement. Here is where
two variations of the matrix become useful. The authoriza
tion list and the capability list systems have shown to be
more suitable and realistic to implement. In both cases
protection data is maintained but the distinction is
whether it is maintained by user (capability list) or in
relation to objects (authorization list). In capability
systems, each subject must keep a collection of keys for
the objects of interest, keys issued by the owners of
these objects with possible granting privileges. These
systems require each subject to present the correct key
whenever a privilege is requested.
In access- list systems a list of authorized users is
kept with each object. The security system checks this
list whenever access is requested and oversees that all
access conditions are met. The subject only needs to pro
vide identification/authentication information which will
lead to the initialization of his profile. For this usei
convenience reason, such systems could be appealing for
database management systems. The authorization list sys
tems permit the revocation of privileges without consulta
tion with the user who is losing the privilege. They per
mit an auditor to determine the range of access without
having the access himself.
104
In both authorization list and capability list
schemes, what is controlled is access to the container of
the data rather than access to the data itself. Access
control mechanisms could not be based only on the type of
access (e.g., read, write, delete). More complex controls
are required in a general-purpose DBMS to ensure:
(1) containei dependent security (e.g. "user U cannot
access the domain SALARY")
(2) value-dependent security (e.g. "user U can retrieve
the domain SALARY if, and only if, salary value is
less than $2000")
(3) context-dependent security (e.g. "user U cannot
retrieve the domain SALARY together with the domain
NAME")
These controls have to be stated in a "logical form"
and cannot be provided by a straightforward capability or
authorization list mechanism. Two basic mechanisms have
been defined to implement access control at the external
level of a general-purpose DBMS: views and query modifica
tion. The view mechanism offers the user the sensitive
data he has the right to manipulate; other data are hid
den. Such a view is built (dynamically or statically) from
the global schema and the security constraints.
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In the query modification mechanism, the user request
is considered a "virtual" one. The actual interaction with
the database takes place after appending (logical AND) the
concerned security constraints to the user request.
Whatever approach is taken to enforce management
security policies, the final protection system should help
certain characteristics, or should have attained a series
of goals. We'll summarize the goals by which database pro
tection systems should be evaluated.
(1) The granularity of the protection specifications must
be variable; it must be possible to selectively con
trol access to arbitrary logical subsets of a data
base. In a database management system there are no
fixed boundaries between protected objects. In a
given database application environment, it may be
necessary to selectively permit access to only cer
tain records in a file, or allow a user to examine or
update a subset of the fields of a record. Furthet
more, a protection specification for a database can
refer to information anywhere in the database (e.g.,
corre 1at i ng informat ion in severa 1 f i 1es ) .
(2) The protection specifications must facilitate grant
ing access to derived information. It must be possi
ble to control access to data that is calculated from
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information in the database, such as statistical sum
maries or logical reorganization of the information.
(3) It should be possible to control the particular types
of domain specific operations (operation specific to
a particular application domain) that can be pei
formed on a database. It is not always sufficient to
be able to specify what data a user can access, but
rather specifically what he is allowed to do with it.
It is sometimes useful to be able to limit a user to
certain types of database operations.
(4) Dynamic control of the protection specifications is
necessary, as the needs of an application environment
are not constant. It must be possible to selectively
grant and revoke access privileges, as well as to
immediately revoke an access privilege, if this
becomes necessary.
(5) The distribution of authority to control protection
specifications must provide for flexibility, e.g., by
allowing users to grant access to information they
"own". It is desirable to minimize the amount of
trust that must be given any individual. However,
since a shared database is involved, conflicting
requirements must somehow be balanced.
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(6) An effective user interface to the protection system
must be provided. The interface must deal with
administrators who issue the protection specifica
tions, as well as with users who encounter access
restrictions (and potentially violate them). The cen
tral problem is that of issuing and maintaining pro
tection specifications. The goal is a scheme that is
easy to use and easy to learn, although these
requirements often conflict.
(7) The protection scheme must be flexible and generally
applicable, i.e., special izable to a variety of
application environments. The scheme must satisfac
torily support complex protection specifications, but
must also not be cumbersome when careful control is
not warranted.
(8) The protection scheme and its underlying mechanism
must be reliable. Users need to have confidence in
it. It must have fail safe defaults, such as a
default to deny access. The protection scheme and a
set of protection specifications based on it must be
auditable. The design of the mechanism should be
open, it the sense that its success does not depend
on user ignorance.
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(9) The protection mechanism must be cost effective. The
run time costs are particularly crucial for database
management systems, as repetitive operations are com
monplace. An inefficient protection mechanism can
tremendously degrade the effectiveness of a database
management system; if the cost of employing a protec
tion system is too high, it may not be used despite
the need for privacy controls.
Many of these requirements may conflict, e.g., flexi
bility, the adequacy of user interface, and the cost of
use. Consequently, balances, tradeoffs, and compromises
must be considered in practice.
A number of software packages provide access control
and related functions. The market for these programs
appears to be growing as users become more concerned about
security. Examples are ACF2, RACF, and Top Secret. Typical
functions provided by such packages are authenticating
users, maintaining access control information, checking
authorization to use files or other objects, logging, and
producing reports. RACF (Resource Access Control Facility)
for example, provides access control by: (1) Identifying
and verifying system users, (2) Authorizing access to sys
tem resources, (3) Logging and reporting of unauthorized
attempts to enter the system and to access to protected
resources. RACF maintains an access control list for each
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object. Users may belong to groups and receive all the
privileges of their group. RACF is basically an open sys
tem in that resources not defined to RACF are not pro
tected. ACF2 is a closed system, in which resources not
defined to ACF2 are protected. RACF can, however, provide
closed system protection for any specified set of
resources.
The presence of protection mechanisms does not
guarantee security. Penetration analysis (sometimes called
the "tiger team" approach) has helped locate security
weaknesses. But, like program testing, it does not prove
the absence of flaws. Even with advanced technology for
developing and verifying systems, it is unlikely systems
will be absolutely secure. Computer systems are extremely
complex and vulnerable to many subtle forms of attack.
There is one architectural approach that could help
in the verification of a security system. The objective of
it is to isolate the access checking mechanism in a small
system nucleus responsible for enforcing security. The
nucleus, called a "security kernel", mediates all access
requests to ensure they are permitted by the system's
security policies. The security of the system is esta
blished by proving the protection policies meet the
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requirements of the system, and that the kernel correctly
enforces the policies. If the kernel is small, the verifi
cation effort is considerably less than that required for
a complete operating system.
But there are other considerations to be taken, like
the trust between users of the database. The complete
solution of the protection problem must find a balance
between technical and nontechnical issues. More research
is required in both issues, especially on methods of
detecting and reporting violations and on coordinating
external regulations with internal protection mechanisms.
Database security will continue to be recognized as
an important goal. One can expect to see some transforma
tions of this goal, however, for a number of reasons.
First, new uses (such as the growing use of distributed
systems) for databases will impose new requirements.
Second, changes in hardware and software technology may
eliminate some of the old problems while introducing new
ones.
Office systems, offer a whole new set of problems,
since their databases consist largely of text and graphic
material (which may be noncoded information). Text and
graphic objects have complex structures and therefore may
consist of smaller objects of differing authorization
Ill
characterist ics.
Further research will be seen in security of commer
cial systems, distributed databases, inference, theory of
authorization, and architecture for secure database sys
tems, as well as in the field of database audit and con
trol, especially as it relates to the DBMS.
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Appendix I - Glossary
Access - the ability and the means necessary to approach,
to store or retrieve data.
Access Control - the process of limiting access to the
resources of a computer system only to authorized users,
programs and processes.
Access Control Mechanism - hardware or software features,
operating procedures, management procedures and various
combinations of these designed to detect and prevent unau
thorized access and to permit authorized access to a com
puter system.
Access Type - the nature of an access to a particular
resource; e. g. , read, write, execute, append, delete,
create.
Append Only - a class of access privilege that permits the
user to add data only, not to read or write.
Authentication - the act of identifying and verifying the
eligibility of an individual to access specific categories
of information.
Authorization - the granting to a user, program or process
the right of access.
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Compartmentat ion - keeping the data and programs of dif
ferent desired accessibility separated from each other,
separating the resources available to concurrent users.
Database - (1) a single file containing information in a
format applicable to any user's needs and available when
needed. (2) all information required to process a set of
one or more applications.
Database Administrator - an EDP manager charged with
approving the design and implementation of database
management systems.
Database Management System (DBMS) - the totality of all
routines that provide access to data, enforce storage con
ventions and regulate the use of input-output devices for
a specified database.
Data-dependent protection - protection of data at a level
commensurate with the sensitivity level of individual data
elements, rather than with the sensitivity of the entire
file which includes the data element.
Data security - the protection of data from accidental or
malicious modification, destruction or disclosure.
Execute Only - a type of access to a program that confers
upon the user the right to run it but not to read the code
nor alter it.
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Hand Geometry - an identifying code derived from the
length of the fingers, the shape of finger endings, and
the translucency of the skin.
Ident i f icat ion - the process that enables, generally by
the use of unique machine-readable names, recognition of
users or resources as identical to those previously
described to a computer system.
Login - a physical procedure in which a terminal user is
identified to the computer operating system prior to any
processing.
Need-to-know - a requirement for a person to receive
information in order to perform his duties.
Password - a protected word or a string of characters that
identify a user. Synonymous with codeword, keyword, lock-
word.
Query Language - a high-level language designed for a
speci fie set of transactions to interrogate a database.
Security - mechanisms and techniques that control who may
use or modify the computer or the information stored in
it.
User - individual who is accountable for some identifiable
set of activities in a computer system. May refer to a
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natural person, an entity (program or process) possessing
privileges equivalent to those of a natural person, or a
group of persons (class or project).
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